Sovereign Debt Risk in Emerging Countries: Does Inflation Targeting Adoption Make Any Difference? by BALIMA, Weneyam Hippolyte et al.
Sovereign Debt Risk in Emerging Countries: Does
Inflation Targeting Adoption Make Any Difference?
Weneyam Hippolyte Balima, Jean-Louis Combes, Alexandru Minea
To cite this version:
Weneyam Hippolyte Balima, Jean-Louis Combes, Alexandru Minea. Sovereign Debt Risk in
Emerging Countries: Does Inflation Targeting Adoption Make Any Difference?. 2015.04. 2015.
<halshs-01128239v2>
HAL Id: halshs-01128239
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01128239v2
Submitted on 25 Mar 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
C E N T R E  D ' E T U D E S  
E T  D E  R E C H E R C H E S  
S U R  L E  D E V E L O P P E M E N T  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
 
 
 
SERIE ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS 
 
Sovereign Debt Risk in Emerging Countries: 
Does Inflation Targeting Adoption Make Any Difference? 
 
Wenéyam Hippolyte BALIMA 
Jean-Louis COMBES 
Alexandru MINEA 
 
Etudes et Documents n° 4 
February 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cite this document: 
Balima W.H., Combes J.L., Minea A. (2015) “Sovereign Debt Risk in Emerging Countries: 
Does Inflation Targeting Adoption Make Any Difference?” Etudes et Documents, n° 4, CERDI. 
http://cerdi.org/production/show/id/1658/type_production_id/1  
 
CERDI  
65 BD. F. MITTERRAND 
63000 CLERMONT FERRAND – FRANCE 
TEL. + 33 4 73 17 74 00  
FAX + 33 4 73 17 74 28 
www.cerdi.org 
Etudes et Documents n° 04, CERDI, 2015 
 2 
The authors 
 
Wenéyam Hippolyte Balima  
PhD Candidate 
Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, CERDI, F-63009 Clermont Fd  
Email: weneyam_hippolyte.balima@udamail.fr  
 
Jean-Louis Combes 
Professor 
Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, CERDI, F-63009 Clermont Fd  
Email: j-louis.combes@udamail.fr  
 
Alexandru Minea 
Professor 
Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, CNRS, UMR 6587, CERDI, F-63009 Clermont Fd  
Email: alexandru.minea@udamail.fr  
 
Corresponding author: Alexandru MINEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Etudes et Documents are available online at: http://www.cerdi.org/ed   
 
 
Director of Publication: Vianney Dequiedt 
Editor: Catherine Araujo Bonjean 
Publisher: Chantal Brige-Ukpong  
ISSN: 2114 - 7957 
 
 
Disclaimer:  
Etudes et Documents is a working papers series. Working Papers are not refereed, they constitute research in 
progress. Responsibility for the contents and opinions expressed in the working papers rests solely with the 
authors. Comments and suggestions are welcome and should be addressed to the authors. 
Etudes et Documents n° 04, CERDI, 2015 
 3 
Abstract  
Based on a sample of 38 emerging countries, we find that inflation targeting (IT) adoption improves 
sovereign debt risk. However, we show that IT adoption effectiveness is sensitive to several 
structural characteristics, such as the phase of the business cycle, the fiscal stance, and the level of 
development. In addition, the measure of the risk, namely ratings (rating agencies) or bond yield 
spreads (markets), as well as the form of IT (full-fledged or partial) is equally crucial for the effects of 
IT adoption on sovereign debt risk. Thus, our paper provides valuable insights for IT implementation 
as a device for improving emerging market economies’ access to international financial markets for 
financing long-term investment projects and supporting potential economic growth. 
 
Key words: Inflation targeting; Sovereign debt ratings; Government bond yield spreads, Emerging 
markets; Propensity scores matching 
 
JEL codes: E44, E58, H63, F34, G15 
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I. Introduction 
The recent crisis engendered major macroeconomic imbalances, such as large unemployment, 
low economic growth, rapid expansion of government debts, and fiscal and current account 
deficits. This resulted in a worsening of access conditions to financial markets, and 
particularly in a sizeable increase of sovereign debt risk. According to Csonto & Ivaschenko 
(2013), the government borrowing cost of emerging markets, measured by the JP Morgan 
EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index), quadrupled from 200 (beginning of 2007) to more 
than 800 basis points (end of 2009). Consequently, the debate on the determinants of 
sovereign risk is currently into the spotlight. 
There exists an important literature on the determinants of sovereign risk, especially in 
emerging countries. Risk is generally measured by (i) government debt ratings from notation 
agencies, (ii) yield spreads with respect to a country’s sovereign bonds assumed as risk-free, 
or (iii) Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads. In one of the first contribution using measure (i), 
Cantor & Packer (1996) employ Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings for 49 countries, 
and find that higher ratings are due to higher income per capita, rapid GDP growth, low 
inflation, low external debt, high level of economic development, and the absence of default 
history. Capitalizing on these findings, subsequent studies emphasized additional 
determinants of ratings, such as exchange reserves or the current account balance 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; Afonso et al., 2011; Ratha et al., 2011), the fiscal balance, 
trade openness or institutions (Bario & Packer, 2004; Depken et al., 2007), the political 
business cycle (Block & Vaaler, 2004), or fiscal transparency (Hameed, 2005). Moreover, the 
major determinants of (ii) government bond yields are domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Edwards, 1986; Cline, 1995; Cline & Barnes, 1997; Borio & Packer, 2004; 
Berganza et al., 2004; Baldacci & Kumar, 2010; Arezki & Brückner, 2012; Hilscher & 
Nosbusch, 2010; Baldacci et al., 2011; Hatchondo et al., 2012; Comelli, 2012; Aizenman & 
Jinjarak, 2012; Eichler, 2014; Costantini et al., 2014) and global conditions in financial 
markets and international factors (Arora & Cerisola, 2001; Sy, 2002; Bellas et al., 2010; 
Jaramillo & Tejada, 2011; Arslanalp & Poghosyan, 2014), including GDP growth, public 
debt, foreign exchange reserves, inflation rate, crisis episodes, and the FED interest rate. 
Lastly, a recent literature using (iii) CDS spreads attributes high market default risks to weak 
macroeconomic fundamentals and global market factors (Pan & Singleton, 2008; Zhang, 
2008; Aizenman et al., 2013; Longstaff et al., 2011). 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of sovereign debt risk by 
analyzing how rating agencies and bondholders perceive the sovereign risk of inflation 
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targeting (IT) countries, compared to countries under money or exchange rate targeting. 
Indeed, simple stylized facts reported in Appendix 1 show that (i) the majority of the twelve 
emerging countries that adopted IT experienced a substantial improvement in their credit 
rating after having adopted IT; and (ii) following IT adoption, bond yield spreads decreased in 
three-fourth of emerging IT countries. In complement to these illustrations, several theoretical 
arguments support the idea that IT countries could be treated differently by rating agencies 
and financial markets in terms of sovereign debt risk. 
First, previous studies found that, due to the limits it imposes on seigniorage revenues, IT 
adoption improves fiscal discipline (Minea & Tapsoba, 2014), by reforming the tax system or 
rationalizing public expenditure1 (Rose, 2007; Freedman & Ötker-Robe, 2009; Lucotte, 
2012). Such efforts constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with the 
government intertemporal budget constraint. In turn, the improvement of fiscal discipline may 
increase the willingness and the ability of government to repay the debt and its burden on 
time. As shown by Heylen et al. (2013), a fiscal consolidation contributes significantly to debt 
reduction in the long-run. We should therefore expect a reduction in sovereign debt risk 
following IT adoption. 
Second, several studies highlighted that monetary policy can have an indirect effect on fiscal 
effort through inflation eroding the real value of taxes (the Keynes-Oliveira-Tanzi effect, 
Tanzi, 1992). In addition, many authors showed that IT is more effective than other monetary 
regimes in reducing the level and volatility of inflation, especially in emerging countries 
(Vega & Winkelried, 2005; Gonçalves & Salles, 2008; Lin & Ye, 2009, 2012). Thus, IT could 
mitigate the Keynes-Oliveira-Tanzi effect, and limit the uncertainty on tax revenues. This 
may ultimately increase government solvency, thereby reducing sovereign debt risk. 
Third, the mere perennity of IT is crucially related to central bank independence and 
transparency, which affect the credibility of monetary authorities. Moreover, the credibility of 
fiscal and monetary authorities is a key discriminating factor to access international capital 
markets, as illustrated by the recent debt crisis experienced by several Eurozone countries. 
Consequently, IT adoption can send a strong signal for macroeconomic reforms, with positive 
consequences on government debt risk. 
Finally, we can add two additional substantial motives to these arguments supporting a 
potential favorable effect of IT adoption on sovereign debt risk. On the one hand, according to 
                                                          
1 For example, in Turkey, the reforms of the statutes of the central bank engendered by the IT implementation in 
January 2006 (under the auspices of the IMF and in close coordination with the fiscal authorities), were 
accompanied by fiscal policy improvements, in the form of the announcement of annual primary surplus targets. 
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the “Fisher effect” (coined by Irving Fisher, 1930), an increase in expected inflation erodes 
the real value of the return on government bonds, thus decreasing (and increasing) the 
demand (supply) for bonds, and further increasing interest rates on bonds. Through involving 
low inflation rates, IT adoption cools down inflation expectations, and therefore reduces 
bonds yields. On the other hand, according to the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), a 
rise in inflation generating the depreciation of the domestic currency negatively affects 
investors’ expectations about a country’s ability to repay its public foreign currency debt, and 
thus can increase bond yield spreads. Given its performances in reducing inflation, IT 
adopting could affect rating agencies and investors’ views on sovereign debt risk. 
 
Despite a large literature evaluating the effects of IT on several macroeconomic variables,2 no 
study has yet estimated the relationship between IT adoption and sovereign debt risk, with the 
notable exception of Fouejieu & Roger (2013). In this paper, we develop their analysis on 
several grounds. First, in addition to government bond yield spreads, we use a second 
measure of sovereign debt risk, namely government debt ratings from notation agencies.3 This 
allows distinguishing among sovereign debt risk from the perspective of rating agencies and 
investors, respectively. Indeed, while bond yield plays an important role in determining the 
cost of capital, debt ratings play a central role in determining both the cost and the capital 
flows across countries. Moreover, not only the direction of causality between ratings and 
spreads is subject to debate,4 but some studies highlight that ratings have little market impact 
or fail to predict crisis episodes (Reinhart, 2002; IMF, 2010). Finally, differences in risk’s 
perception by credit agencies and markets are supported by a simple illustrative comparison. 
Despite sharing the same rating grade in 2011-12 (“BBB”, according to S&P), Brazil and 
Bulgaria displayed significantly different spreads during the same period. Therefore, it is vital 
to go beyond a unique measure of sovereign debt risk, in order to appropriately assess the 
consequences of IT adoption. 
                                                          
2 For example, many studies, including e.g. Levin, Natalucci & Piger (2004), Petursson (2005), Vega & 
Winkelried (2005), Batini & Laxton (2007), Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Rose (2007), Gonçalves & 
Salles (2008), Lin & Ye (2007, 2009, 2012, 2013), Frappa & Mésonnier (2010), Lin (2010), Miles (2007), Abo-
Zaid & Tuzemen (2012), Bleich et al., 2012, Ftiti & Hichri, 2014, Minea & Tapsoba (2014), defend the merits of 
IT adoption for a wide range of monetary or real goals. Nevertheless, other studies emphasize negative (Brito & 
Bystedt, 2010) or inconclusive (Ball & Sheridan, 2005; Ball, 2010) effects of IT adoption. 
3 The only reason for abstracting of CDS as a third measure of sovereign debt risk is that the largest majority of 
countries in our sample adopted IT previous to the publication of CDS data (for example, Bloomberg or Reuters 
report CDS only starting 2004). 
4 For example, Hartelius et al. (2008), Jaramillo & Tejada (2011), and Sy (2002) find that rating changes 
significantly impact yield spreads, contrary to Gonzalez-Rozada & Yeyati (2008) who conclude that rating 
changes respond to, rather than influence, spreads. 
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Second, IT adoption is subject to a self-selection bias. Following the literature on the effects 
of IT adoption, we consider IT as a natural experiment and draw upon recently-used 
propensity scores matching (PSM) methods (Vega & Winkelried, 2005; Lin & Ye, 2007, 
2009, 2012, 2013; Lin, 2010). In particular, PSM have the merit of properly identifying the 
control group through a list of well-identified observed variables.5 
Third, compared to Foujieu & Roger (2013), we made the choice of focusing our analysis 
exclusively on emerging countries, for the following reasons. To begin with, emerging 
countries are particularly concerned with the issue of sovereign debt risk, because of the large 
amount of capitals they must raise to further finance their economic development, and also 
given the large and rapidly expanding size of sovereign debt markets. Furthermore, emerging 
markets generally display a large variation in the risk of sovereign insolvency, and are among 
the high-yield borrowers in the world, so the question of the drivers of sovereign risk is a 
crucial policy issue. Next, since previous studies emphasized notably different effects of IT 
adoption in developing and developed countries (for example, in terms of fiscal discipline, see 
Minea & Tapsoba, 2014), it is more appropriate to perform estimations on the more 
homogenous sample of emerging countries. Last, we significantly enlarge the sample of 
emerging countries, from 18 in Foujieu & Roger (2013) to 38; (more than) doubling the 
number of countries is particular important for the robustness of our results, given the use of 
the PSM technique. 
Fourth, we extensively discuss the potential heterogeneity of the effect of IT adoption on both 
measures of sovereign debt risk, conditional upon a wide set of variables, including the phase 
of the business cycle, the fiscal stance, and the level of economic development. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of IT adoption on bond yield variability. Indeed, given their 
still fragile integration into international capital markets, emerging countries have historically 
been subject to high financial stress, often resulting in a sudden massive capital withdrawal 
and high variability of government borrowing costs.6 As a result, policymakers are concerned 
not only by the level, but also by the variability of the borrowing cost. By reducing policy 
uncertainly, IT adoption could better anchor investors’ expectations, thereby reducing the 
variability of the spreads. 
                                                          
5 The choice of this method prevents us from specifying a certain autocorrelation structure in the error term, 
needed to identify lagged variables as valid instruments, as this is the case with the GMM method used by 
Foujieu & Roger (2013). In addition, we deal with a common critique of PSM methods by controlling for the 
potential effect of unobservables through submitting our results to such robustness tests. 
6 For instance, during 1998-2002 Argentina’s depression, the government borrowing cost increased dramatically 
from 476 (December 1997) to 1982 basis points (September 1998). At the end of 2002, Argentina borrowing 
cost was thirteen times larger than its level in December 1997. 
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Our results are the following. We find that IT adoption significantly increases sovereign debt 
ratings and decreases government bond yield spreads in emerging markets. The magnitude of 
this favorable effect is economically meaningful, namely between 2 and 4.5 pp for spreads, 
and an additional 2 rating grades. In this latter case, IT adoption can move emerging countries 
to investment grade status that can considerably increase and diversify their investors’ 
portfolio. The robustness of these results is supported by several post-estimation tests, and by 
a wide set of specifications, such as abstracting of “dollarized” countries, hyperinflation 
episodes, or oil exporters, accounting for additional covariates, and drawing upon alternative 
specifications for computing propensity scores. 
In addition, we explore the heterogeneity of our findings by disaggregating the sample 
according to several structural characteristics, including the level of economic development, 
the phase of the business cycle, and the fiscal stance. Regarding sovereign debt ratings, we 
find that IT adoption improves them both in “good” and “bad” times. However, the estimated 
effects is stronger in bad times, revealing IT particular performance against large negative 
shocks. Next, although adopting IT increases ratings irrespective of the fiscal stance, its 
effectiveness is larger in countries with strong fiscal stance, making the case for better policy 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Moreover, the level of economic 
development is an important determinant of IT adoption performances, since ratings increase 
in upper-middle income countries exclusively. Regarding bond yield spreads, although IT 
adoption is found to exert some effects in good times, it has no significant impact on spreads 
in bad times. Next, consistent with its favorable effect on ratings, IT adoption has no 
significant impact on spreads under a loose fiscal stance. Finally, as this was the case for 
ratings, only upper-middle income countries are found to significantly benefit of IT adoption 
in the form of lower spreads. 
Our results provide valuable insights on the relationship between IT adoption and sovereign 
debt risk. Indeed, the implementation of an IT monetary framework should be performed with 
caution. First, in several cases, IT adoption is not found to significantly reduce sovereign debt 
risk, irrespective of the way risk is measured (for example, in low-middle income emerging 
countries). Second, rating agencies and markets do not identically value IT adoption in terms 
of risks, highlighting the importance of looking at alternative sovereign debt risk measures. 
Finally, we find that the form of IT is of crucial importance, as only full-fledged IT generate a 
large increase spreads in bad times, or a significant decrease of bond yield spreads relative to 
emerging countries with exchange rate targeting. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data and the 
empirical methodology. Section III presents the results of the effect of IT on sovereign debt 
ratings and bond yield spreads. Section IV addresses the quality of the matching and different 
heterogeneity tests. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data 
We use an annual panel covering the period 1993-2012. Countries in our sample are 
exclusively selected based on the availability of government bond yield data, and are those 
composing the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global from Bloomberg. 
The J.P. Morgan dataset provides government bond yield spreads for 41 emerging countries at 
until 2012. For consistency, we stick to the same sample when constructing data for sovereign 
debt ratings. We dropped three countries from the initial sample because of missing data 
(Iraq, Serbia and Trinidad & Tobago), leading to a final sample of 38 emerging countries. 
In the following we present our main variables. Regarding our treatment variable, we define 
inflation targeting (IT) as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country i at period t is under an IT 
regime, and to 0 if the central bank uses money or exchange rate targeting. We compile data 
on IT using several sources (Batini et al., 2006, Rose, 2007, Roger, 2009, Gemayel et al., 
2011, and Warburton & Davies, 2012). Following Rose (2007), we distinguish between (i) 
default starting dates or partial IT (softit), and (ii) conservative starting dates or full-fledged 
IT (fullit), in order to test the sensibility of our results to IT beginning dates.7 Out of the 38 
emerging countries in our sample, 12 adopted IT by the end of 2012 (see Appendices 2 and 3 
for the list of IT countries and their starting dates, and for the control group of countries, and 
Appendices 11 and 12 for descriptive statistics and sources and definitions of data). 
Regarding the dependent variable, we measure sovereign debt risk in two ways. On the one 
hand, using the yield spread between each emerging country and US sovereign bonds. As 
previously emphasized, data on spreads (in basis points) come from the J.P. Morgan EMBI 
Global index, which includes Brady bonds, loans, and Eurozone bonds issued by sovereign 
entities with a minimum size of 500 million USD and 12-years average maturity. 
On the other hand, we measure sovereign risk by long-term foreign-currency government debt 
ratings provided by financial rating agencies. Sovereign ratings capture the willingness and 
the ability of a government to repay its debt at the due date. Since they provide insights on the 
                                                          
7 Contrary to default starting dates, conservative starting dates signal the achievement of the five conditions 
presented by Mishkin (2000). 
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estimated probability of default, ratings are a decision support tool from investors’ standpoint. 
The international credit market rating is dominated by three main agencies, namely, Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch; the former two share 80% of the market, whereas Fitch 
covers 15%. Agency grades range from AAA (highest credit quality) to C or D (highest 
vulnerability or default). Following Sy (2002), we use a linear transformation to convert 
ratings into a discrete variable, which ranges from 0 (the lowest grade) to 20 (the highest 
grade). For an aggregate representation of sovereign risks, we use data from all three 
agencies: based on numerical data from each of the three rating agencies, we compute an 
arithmetic average rating per country. Finally, in computing country-ratings, we account for 
the following two issues. First, as in Chen et al. (2013), if a country experienced several rating 
changes during the same year, we consider only the first rating change, to reduce potential 
problems due to overlapping data. Second, if no rating is provided for a country between two 
rating dates, we assume that this country does not have a rating change, so we just consider 
the latest rating. Data on sovereign ratings are collected from the three rating agencies’ 
websites, and Appendix 4 details the numerical transformation made to rating data. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
Our aim is to compare the effect of IT adoption on sovereign debt risk, relative to countries 
that did not adopt IT. To this end, we use a variety of propensity score matching methods to 
evaluate the average treatment effect of IT on risk, namely the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) 
( )[ ] [ ] [ ]111 0101 =−===−= iiiiiii ITYEITYEITYYEATT ,    (1) 
with iIT  the inflation targeting dummy, 1iY  the outcome of the IT country i, and 0iY  the 
outcome of the same country i had it not have adopted IT. Since 0iY  is not observable, we 
estimate the ATT by comparing the outcome of the treated group (IT) to those of the control 
group (non-IT), provided IT adoption is random. However, the latter assumption is unlikely, 
and the literature emphasized several pre-conditions to the IT adoption. To overcome the 
potential problem of omitted variables (correlated with both outcome variables and IT 
adoption), leading to a self-selection problem, we follow previous work and draw upon 
propensity score matching (PSM) methods. 
PSM consists of pairing IT and non-IT based on the probability of adopting IT, i.e. it consists 
of comparing countries with similar observed characteristics, and attributing differences in 
outcome between treated and non-treated to the treatment. Importantly, the use of matching 
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methods lies on the conditional independence assumption, stating that, conditional to a vector 
of observable variables X, the outcome variable is independent of the IT adoption.8 Thus, 
replacing [ ]10 =ii ITYE  by the observable term [ ]iii XITYE ,00 = , equation (1) becomes 
[ ] [ ]iiiiii XITYEXITYEATT ,0,1 01 =−== .      (2) 
Finally, to account for possible implementation difficulties related to an important number of 
covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest matching treated and untreated on the basis 
of propensity scores (PS), namely, the individual probability of receiving the treatment, 
conditional to the observable characteristics X: ( ) [ ] ( )iiiii XITXITEXp 1Pr === .9 Thus, the 
use of PS turns the computation of ATT into 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]iiiiii XpITYEXpITYEATT ,0,1 01 =−== .     (3) 
Several varieties of PSM are available to estimate (3). First, the N-nearest-neighbor matching, 
which consists of matching each IT with N-untreated-countries with the closest propensity 
scores. To improve the quality of the matching, the observation of the control group is 
matched with replacement, i.e. an untreated observation in the control group can be paired 
with more than one treated unit. Following Lin and Ye (2007, 2009, 2012, 2013), we consider 
the nearest (n=1), the two nearest (n=2), and the three nearest neighbors (n=3). Second, we 
draw upon the radius method of Dehejia & Wahba (2002), which matches each treated with 
the untreated located at some distance, defined in terms of PS. Following the related 
literature, we consider a small (r=0.005), a medium (r=0.01), and a wide (r=0.05) radius. 
Third, we use the kernel matching coined by Heckman et al. (1998), which matches each 
treated with the distribution of untreated in the common support, with weights inversely 
proportional to the gap with respect to the PS of each treated (consistent with previous 
literature, we use an Epanechnikov kernel). Fourth, we employ the local linear matching, 
which is similar to the kernel matching but includes a linear term in the weighting function. 
Finally, following Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), we perform the matching using a 
stratification method. Based on Cochran & Chambers (1965), we split the common support of 
propensity scores in five equal strata, such as there are no statistical differences between the 
PS of IT compared to non-IT countries. Thus, the ATT is computed as the mean of the 
                                                          
8 In our case this means that, under a set of observable covariates, there are no unobservable variables that could 
affect differently targeters and non-targeters. Given the importance of this assumption, we will provide a 
sensibility test for assessing the influence of non-observables. 
9 The estimated PS allow summarizing the vector of observable characteristics X into a one-dimensional 
variable. The empirical validity of estimated PS is based on the condition of common support: ( )1<iXp , 
assuming the existence of comparable counterfactual for each treated observation for each year (i.e. for each IT 
country, there are some no-IT countries with fairly close probabilities of adopting IT). 
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estimated treatment effect for each stratum, weighted by the share of treated observations in 
each stratum. 
 
III. Results 
We present in this section the results of the effect of IT on sovereign debt ratings and 
government bond yield spreads, respectively.10 
 
3.1. Inflation targeting and sovereign debt ratings 
We estimate the PS using a probit model, in which the dependent variable is IT adoption. 
Following Lin & Ye (2007, 2009, 2012, 2013), we consider two groups of control variables.11 
First, those highlighted by the literature as preconditions for IT adoption, namely, lag 
inflation, lag public debt (% of GDP), lag public deficit, real GDP growth, and law & order. 
The former three variables are expected to be negatively correlated with IT; indeed, IT 
adoption is more likely after a successful period of deflation (Masson et al., 1997), while a 
high level of public debt or deficit can be a signal of fiscal dominance, thereby hindering IT 
adoption. Regarding the latter two variables, we equally expect a negative effect of real GDP 
growth and of law & order, as strong growth and institutional performances can be interpreted 
as the result of sound macroeconomic policies that do not require adopting alternative 
policies, such as IT adoption. 
The second group of variables captures the likelihood of adopting alternative monetary policy 
rules, such as monetary or exchange rate targeting. We consider a dummy variable of fixed 
exchange rate regime, and the trade openness-to-GDP ratio. A flexible exchange rate regime 
is considered as an initial condition for IT; thus, a fixed exchange rate and IT should be 
incompatible (Brenner & Sokoler, 2010). Besides, since emerging countries are relatively 
open to trade, they tend to adopt exchange rate targeting, due, for example, to “fear of 
floating” (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002). 
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of PS using conservative IT starting dates. Let us 
focus on our baseline regression [0]. All estimated parameters present the expected sign and, 
except for trade openness, are significant: lag inflation, lag public debt, lag deficit, lag real 
GDP growth, and the fixed exchange rate dummy negatively affect IT adoption. The 
                                                          
10 We report that, prior to the estimation, unit root tests (Maddala & Wu, 1999; Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003; and 
Pesaran, 2007) revealed the absence of a unit root for all variables (except for three control variables, for which 
we use the first difference). The results of unit root tests are available upon request. 
11 The goal of estimating PS is not to find the best model for predicting IT adoption; according to the conditional 
independence assumption, it is not a problem to exclude variables that systematically affect IT adoption but do 
not affect sovereign debt risk. 
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explanatory power of our model is fairly important, as McFadden’s pseudo R2 is close to 
30%. 
Based on PS estimated from benchmark regression [0], we define the common support 
ensuring that treated and control groups are comparable, using the “Min-Max” method of 
Dehejia & Wahba (1999).12 Using conservative starting dates, the ATT of IT adoption on 
sovereign debt ratings is presented in Table 2, along with standard errors based on bootstrap 
resampling with 500 replications. As illustrated by line [0], ATTs are positive and statistically 
significant, irrespective of the matching method. The estimated ATT varies between 2.216 
(for radius matching, r=0.01) and 2.679 (for stratification matching), and is economically 
meaningful. Indeed, the average sovereign debt rating in no-IT emerging countries 
approximately equals 9, which is equivalent to a Ba2, BB and BB for Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch rating symbols, respectively (see Appendices 5). Since this value nearly corresponds to 
the break-point between speculative and investment grades, IT adoption, through its favorable 
effect on sovereign debt ratings, shifts IT countries to investment grade status that can 
considerably increase and diversify their investors’ portfolio (i.e. ratings agencies recognize 
IT adoption as a sound macroeconomic reform, and scale up the rating assigned to targeters 
long-term debt to grades that notably increase their attractiveness). 
We check the robustness of our findings in different ways. First, “dollarized” countries lose 
the control of their monetary policy,13 so we exclude those countries from our sample in 
regression [1] in Table 1. Second, our results might be influenced by hyperinflation episodes; 
hence we drop in [2] observations for which inflation is above 40%. Third, we abstract in 
regression [3] from major oil exporters.14 Fourth, we alter the specification of the baseline 
model used for computing PS by sequentially introducing additional covariates that may 
affect ratings and IT adoption. As illustrated by regressions [4]-[12] in Table 1, these 
additional variables are: the amount of exchange reserves, external debt (% of GNI), 
unemployment, sovereign debt crisis contagion,15 fiscal rule, real GDP per capita, money and 
quasi money (M2) (% of GDP), exchange rate volatility,16 and a dummy variable if a country 
                                                          
12 This method matches all treated and untreated observations except those untreated estimated PS, which are 
less (more) than the minimum (maximum) estimated PS for treated (untreated) observations. 
13 This is also the case for countries in a monetary union (however, only Gabon is concerned with this issue in 
our sample). 
14 As most emerging countries are net oil exporting countries, we excluded only OPEC and top 15 world oil net 
exporters from 2012 U.S. Energy Information Administration classification. 
15 Following Foujieu & Roger (2013), we divide our sample by regions using World Bank’s classification. Then, 
we build a dummy variable for sovereign crisis contagion, equal 1 for country i at period t if at least one of the 
countries in the same region faces a sovereign debt crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
16 The exchange rate volatility is measured by the rolling standard deviation of the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) over three years. 
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has lending arrangements with the IMF. Fifth, following Afonso et al. (2011), we apply an 
alternative numerical transformation of ratings data, namely, a linear transformation ranging 
between 1 (the lowest grade) and 17 (the highest grade). Lines [1]-[13] in Table 2 show that 
estimated ATT remain remarkably significant and of comparable magnitude with results for 
the benchmark model [0].17 Finally, Appendices 5 and 6 confirms these results using default, 
instead of conservative IT starting dates. Consequently, we found that IT adoption 
significantly improves sovereign debt ratings, and, depending on the considered estimation, 
this effect corresponds to a rating improvement between one and two rating grades. 
 
                                                          
17 In addition, we considered Abadie & Imbens (2008) criticism about the use of bootstrap without theoretical 
foundation, and we computed standard deviations based on Abadie et al. (2004). For example, for nearest 
neighbor matching method, the ATT (and their standard-errors) for N equal to one, two, and three, are, 
respectively: 2.651 (0.195), 2.324 (0.196), and 2.386 (0.221), consistent with our baseline results. 
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Table 1. Estimation of PS for Sovereign Debt Ratings (conservative IT starting) 
  [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
VARIABLES 
Baseline 
model 
No 
dollarized 
No 
hyperinflation 
No 
top oil 
exporters 
Adding 
total 
reserves 
Adding 
external 
debt 
Adding 
unemployment 
Adding 
crisis 
contagion 
Adding 
fiscal 
rule 
Adding 
gdp per 
capita 
Adding 
M2 /gdp 
Adding 
REER 
volatility 
Adding 
IMF 
programme 
Lagged inflation -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.103*** -0.113*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0183) (0.0190) (0.0177) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0186) 
Real gdp growth -0.042** -0.043** -0.051** -0.030 -0.057** -0.038* -0.039* -0.041* -0.043** -0.096** -0.041** -0.060*** -0.034 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.039) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) 
Lagged log total debt/gdp -0.512*** -0.526*** -0.526*** -0.866*** -0.375***  -0.522*** -0.510*** -0.493*** -0.528*** -0.519*** -0.521*** -0.579*** 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.144) (0.138)  (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.143) 
Lagged fiscal deficit -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.072*** -0.094*** -0.086*** -0.020 -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.067*** -0.078*** -0.106*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
Law & order -0.231*** -0.272*** -0.240*** -0.170** -0.330*** -0.172*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.199*** -0.239*** -0.284*** -0.227*** -0.265*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0710) (0.0696) (0.0781) (0.0735) (0.0642) (0.0691) (0.0702) (0.0734) (0.0693) (0.0771) (0.0716) (0.0754) 
Log trade openess/gdp -0.317 -0.198 -0.204 0.358 0.666 -0.418 -0.282 -0.279 -0.304 -0.293 -0.472 -0.194 -1.137* 
 (0.594) (0.594) (0.593) (0.672) (0.671) (0.585) (0.589) (0.591) (0.587) (0.593) (0.615) (0.608) (0.653) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy -1.888*** -1.638*** -1.909*** -1.707*** -1.871*** -1.830*** -1.892*** -1.893*** -1.863*** -1.911*** -1.923*** -1.788*** -1.776*** 
 (0.248) (0.254) (0.251) (0.255) (0.296) (0.229) (0.249) (0.251) (0.248) (0.244) (0.264) (0.252) (0.265) 
Log total exchange reserves     9.024***         
     (1.122)         
Lagged log external debt/gni      -0.303        
      (0.311)        
Unemployment rate       0.0768       
       (0.1201)       
Sovereign debt crisis contagion        0.0384      
        (0.0998)      
Fiscal rule         0.286**     
         (0.143)     
Log gdp per capita          5.473*    
          (3.255)    
Log M2/gdp           0.316**   
           (0.145)   
REER volatility            -0.0201  
            (0.0124)  
IMF programme dummy             -0.361** 
             (0.159) 
Constant 3.677*** 3.720*** 3.648*** 3.495*** -26.52*** 2.186** 3.488*** 3.584*** 3.313*** 3.801*** 2.820*** 3.602*** 5.114*** 
 (0.950) (0.939) (0.954) (1.097) (3.873) (0.865) (0.964) (0.948) (0.952) (0.942) (0.979) (0.975) (1.091) 
Pseudo R2 0.2965 0.2755 0.2935 0.2774 0.3874 0.2778 0.2971 0.2967 0.3114 0.3111 0.3132 0.2875 0.3109 
Observations 601 544 587 505 601 609 601 601 601 601 601 571 535 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: ATT of IT adoption on Sovereign Debt Ratings (conservative IT starting dates) 
Dependent variable:  
Sovereign Debt Ratings 
Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local Linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
 Baseline result 
[0] ATT 
2.459** 2.269** 2.257** 2.367*** 2.216*** 2.339*** 2.410*** 2.327*** 2.679*** 
(0.560) (0.532) (0.453) (0.519) (0.458) (0.363) (0.354) (0.334) (0.558) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/330/477 
Sensitivity 
[1] Excluding dollarized countries 
2.065*** 2.439*** 2.403*** 1.921*** 2.429*** 2.413*** 2.457*** 2.424*** 3.262*** 
(0.550) (0.523) (0.450) (0.493) (0.464) (0.327) (0.360) (0.364) (0.943) 
[2] Excluding hyperinflation episodes 
2.459*** 2.269*** 2.257*** 2.365*** 2.213*** 2.332*** 2.402*** 2.320*** 2.332** 
(0.543) (0.514) (0.483) (0.520) (0.454) (0.338) (0.343) (0.344) (1.013) 
[3] Excluding top oil net exporting countries 
2.345*** 2.073*** 2.128*** 2.171*** 2.034*** 2.084*** 2.165*** 2.070*** 3.755 
(0.617) (0.555) (0.503) (0.557) (0.478) (0.409) (0.383) (0.380) (3.800) 
[4] Adding total reserves 
2.048*** 2.062*** 1.797*** 2.373*** 1.874*** 1.855*** 1.905*** 1.832*** 4.715* 
(0.662) (0.594) (0.523) (.597) (0.520) (0.483) (0.434) (0.522) (2.878) 
[5] Adding external debt 
2.521*** 2.636*** 2.711** 2.265*** 2.648*** 2.668*** 2.724*** 2.649*** 2.859*** 
(0.535) (0.466) (0.442) (0.444) (0.414) (0.339) (0.334) (0.334) (0.674) 
[6] Adding unemployment 
1.983*** 1.950*** 2.011** 2.188*** 1.949*** 2.429*** 2.514*** 2.411*** 2.479*** 
(0.545) (0.465) (0.477) (0.532) (0.439) (0.360) (0.365) (0.358) (0.889) 
[7] Adding crisis contagion 
2.127*** 2.051*** 2.194 2.609*** 1.683*** 2.294*** 2.397*** 2.278*** 3.652 
(0.577) (0.481) (0.475) (0.554) (0.427) (0.383) (0.352) (0.361) (2.281) 
[8] Adding fiscal rule 
2.103*** 2.579*** 2.684*** 2.450*** 2.470*** 2.391*** 2.450*** 2.384*** 1.456*** 
(0.540) (0.447) (0.428) (0.508) (0.419) (0.333) (0.353) (0.345) (0.547) 
[9] Adding gdp per capita 
2.263*** 2.277*** 1.714*** 2.112*** 2.148*** 2.386*** 2.442*** 2.395*** 2.408** 
(0.553) (0.467) (0.560) (0.524) (0.426) (0.345) (0.347) (0.366) (1.083) 
[10] Adding M2/gdp 
2.295*** 1.857*** 2.065*** 1.954*** 1.782*** 2.211*** 2.301*** 2.206*** 2.391** 
(0.597) (0.534) (0.512) (0.542) (0.501) (0.375) (0.348) (0.374) (0.960) 
[11] Adding REER volatility 
2.248*** 2.582*** 2.444*** 2.280*** 2.305*** 2.475*** 2.546*** 2.488*** 3.346* 
(0.593) (0.520) (0.471) (0.523) (0.450) (0.363) (0.356) (0.373) (2.007) 
[12] Adding IMF programme 
2.442*** 2.472*** 2.532*** 2.561*** 2.316*** 2.354*** 2.515*** 2.361*** 2.680*** 
(0.531) (0.480) (0.445) (0.521) (0.447) (0.369) (0.373) (0.347) (0.559) 
[13] Numerical rating from 1 to 17 
2.450*** 2.258***  2.246*** 2.344*** 2.194*** 2.318*** 2.387*** 2.306*** 2.679*** 
(0.550) (0.506) (0.456) (0.512) (0.419) (0.347) (0.337) (0.358) (0.558) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.2. Inflation targeting and government bond yield spreads 
Using the same methodology, we now evaluate the effect of IT adoption on government bond 
yield spreads. According to Reinhart (2002), sovereign debt rating plays a crucial role in 
determining, in addition to rated countries’ access to international capital markets, the terms 
of this access. Thus, since IT adoption was found to positively affect sovereign debt rating in 
emerging countries, it may also influence government bond yield spreads. 
Analogous to our previous analysis, we begin by estimating the PS. In addition to the 
covariates used for computing PS for sovereign debt risk, we augment our baseline regression 
[0] in Table 3 with two additional variables, namely total exchange reserves and a dummy 
variable for sovereign debt crisis. As illustrated by regression [0], large exchange reserves 
positively affect IT adoption, contrary to the negative impact of sovereign debt crisis. Overall, 
our baseline model fits reasonably well, as McFadden’s R2 approaches 40%. 
Based on PS estimated in Table 3, we report in Table 4 the estimated ATT of IT adoption on 
government bond yield spreads, using conservatives starting dates. Our baseline estimations 
in line [0] show that ATT are negative and statistically significant; thus, IT adoption is found 
to reduce risk premia on government debt in emerging countries. The size of this effect ranges 
from 226.54 (for stratification matching) to 454.45 (for a low radius, r=0.005) basis points, 
and is economically meaningful: IT emerging countries present lower government bond yield 
spreads, on average between 2 and up to 4.5 pp, compared to countries under monetary or 
exchange rate targeting. 
To check the robustness of our results, we alternatively abstract from dollarized countries, 
hyperinflation episodes, and top oil exporters (in regressions [1]-[3] in Table 4), and we 
account for additional determinants of IT adoption (in regressions [4]-[12] in Table 4). 
Despite some significance loss in some specifications (for example, when excluding 
dollarized economies in line [1], or when controlling for a fiscal rule in line [8], the ATT is 
significant in six out of nine cases), the effect of IT adoption on government bond yield 
spreads is consistent with our results in the baseline specification,18 and it remains so when 
considering default, instead of conservative IT starting dates (see Appendices 7 and 8). 
 
                                                          
18 In addition, ATT (and their standard errors) for the nearest neighbor matching method, using Abadie et al. 
(2004) to compute standard deviations, are consistent with baseline estimations, namely -223.69 (23.11), -204.30 
(32.17), and -192.69 (29.96), for N equal to one, two, and three, respectively. 
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Table 3. Estimation of PS for Government Bond Yield Spreads (conservative IT starting dates) 
 [0] Baseline [1] No [2] No [3] No [4] Adding [5] Adding [6] Adding [7] Adding [8] Adding [9] Adding [10] Adding [11] Adding [12] Adding 
VARIABLES model dollarized hyperinfl Top oil exp ext debt unempl crisis cont CA balance fiscal rule gdp pc M2/gdp REER vol IMF prog 
Lagged inflation -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.080*** -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.110*** -0.116*** -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0188) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0186) (0.0196) 
Real gdp growth -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.051** -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.092** -0.075*** -0.086*** -0.045** 
 (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0417) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0223) 
Lagged log total debt/gdp -0.346** -0.353** -0.357** -0.957***  -0.379*** -0.370*** -0.411*** -0.333** -0.355** -0.311** -0.356** -0.486*** 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.143) (0.180)  (0.144) (0.139) (0.139) (0.143) (0.142) (0.152) (0.143) (0.175) 
Lagged fiscal deficit -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.136*** -0.035* -0.084*** -0.096*** -0.061** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0192) (0.0262) (0.0253) (0.0244) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0265) (0.0259) (0.0300) 
law and order -0.351*** -0.362*** -0.355*** -0.391*** -0.352*** -0.345*** -0.313*** -0.377*** -0.327*** -0.353*** -0.292*** -0.333*** -0.311*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0742) (0.0735) (0.0831) (0.0734) (0.0706) (0.0739) (0.0703) (0.0778) (0.0728) (0.0786) (0.0757) (0.0756) 
Log total exchange reserves 9.165*** 8.794*** 9.210*** 14.20*** 10.44*** 10.18*** 9.695*** 10.63*** 9.005*** 9.109*** 10.78*** 9.204*** 9.922*** 
 (1.144) (1.221) (1.151) (1.600) (1.253) (1.271) (1.179) (1.266) (1.144) (1.148) (1.393) (1.196) (1.424) 
Log trade openness/gdp 0.606 0.602 0.700 0.246 0.283 1.046 1.040  0.553 0.619 1.051 0.765 -0.222 
 (0.684) (0.675) (0.685) (0.786) (0.676) (0.666) (0.676)  (0.684) (0.682) (0.706) (0.685) (0.687) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy -1.876*** -1.791*** -1.881*** -1.511*** -1.783*** -1.874*** -1.908*** -2.002*** -1.839*** -1.887*** -1.771*** -1.826*** -1.495*** 
 (0.293) (0.314) (0.292) (0.317) (0.260) (0.290) (0.307) (0.310) (0.293) (0.288) (0.291) (0.304) (0.277) 
Sovereign debt crisis -1.654* -1.676* -1.309  -1.803** -1.616*  -1.488* -1.732* -1.644* -1.730* -1.254 -1.485* 
 (0.912) (0.921) (0.889)  (0.728) (0.897)  (0.819) (0.912) (0.916) (0.962) (0.790) (0.771) 
Lagged log external debt/gni     0.843**         
     (0.356)         
Unemployment rate      0.443***        
      (0.142)        
Sovereign debt crisis contagion       0.290***       
       (0.111)       
Current account balance        -0.0613***      
        (0.0153)      
Fiscal rule         0.210     
         (0.154)     
Log gdp per capita          2.089    
          (3.475)    
Log M2/gdp           -0.467**   
           (0.198)   
REER volatility            -0.0206  
            (0.0132)  
IMF programme dummy             0.0728 
             (0.167) 
Pseudo R2/Observations 0.3998/601 0.3717/544 0.3951/587 0.4334/480 0.3988/609 0.4133/601 0.3946/601 0.4198/606 0.4027/601 0.4002/601 0.4080/601 0.3817/571 0.4003/535 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. ATT of IT adoption on Government Bond Yield Spreads (conservative IT starting dates) 
Dependent variable: GBY Spreads 
N Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local Linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
-380.29** -315.53** -274.75** -454.45*** -345.10*** -235.09* -271.24*** -244.61** -226.54*** 
(172.78) (161.84) (140.14) (138.18) (126.72) (125.54) (106.99) (111.98) (52.05) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/255/395 
Robustness checks 
[1] Excluding dollarized countries 
-202.94 -181.87 -254.65** -177.38* -184.23 -251.23** -256.02*** -253.86** -370.80*** 
(143.715) (155.32) (127.47) (109.83) (125.59) (112.30) (108.98) (116.06) (105.87) 
[2] Excluding hyperinflation episodes 
-380.29** -315.53* -274.75** -453.85*** -344.62*** -233.92*** -270.12** -243.55* -235.79*** 
(176.59) (177.09) (137.49) (119.38) (134.12) (99.99) (118.44)  (134.32) (21.67) 
[3] Excluding top oil net exporting countries 
-156.26*** -150.26*** -135.78*** -148.78*** -147.39*** -142.38*** -143.34*** -139.95*** -324.98* 
(56.24) (53.15) (50.01) (63.38) (52.09) (45.38) (42.57) (48.18) (195.57) 
[4] Adding external debt 
-211.40 -245.92** -207.92** -160.80* -194.27** -219.38*** -221.03*** -214.01*** -316.89** 
(144.83) (118.39) (100.75) (100.71) (102.23) (81.52) (83.63)  ( 89.88) (151.52) 
[5] Adding unemployment 
-242.03 -218.74* -105.99** -219.77** -294.38** -202.40** -191.12 -202.62* -205.79** 
(160.26) (128.23) (47.80) ( 111.75) (130.08)  (106.40) (131.40) (121.77) (87.69) 
[6] Adding crisis contagion 
-202.25* -178.61* -204.90 -160.96** -145.82** -180.66** -270.88** -172.36* -354.69** 
(112.78) (99.31) (226.73) ( 85.39) (74.92) (94.66) (119.16) (94.11) (144.85) 
[7] Adding current account balance 
-276.97** -319.90*** -122.05*** -361.29*** -298.54*** -291.02*** -257.33*** -290.06*** -256.98*** 
(144.22) (132.01) (47.29) (110.73) (99.49) (101.25) (91.91) (108.10) (75.86) 
[8] Adding fiscal rule 
-211.19 -211.61 -151.86*** -203.15* -169.09 -273.61*** -262.53*** -265.15*** -238.77** 
(154.96) (165.35) (50.73) (123.41) (122.30) (116.59) (111.58) (108.37) (116.30) 
[9] Adding gdp per capita 
-394.28*** -343.69** -134.20*** -326.74*** -287.49** -246.61** -270.76*** -247.59** -331.29* 
(153.64) (148.65) (49.18) (112.38) (133.59) (109.85) (104.67) (123.33) (192.91) 
[10] Adding M2/gdp 
-265.52* -332.90*** -179.63*** -300.96*** -299.84*** -244.36** -265.42** -260.08** -399.63 
(149.02) (131.14) (52.35) (106.11) (100.39) (106.96) (123.05) (111.85) (511.07) 
[11] Adding REER volatility 
-169.13* -192.50** -122.09*** -164.52 -166.23** -171.38*** -161.24*** -169.24*** -324.47* 
(108.28) (84.69) (47.26) (90.48) (78.52) (80.47) (61.44) (66.28) (185.27) 
[12] Adding IMF programme 
-384.38*** -373.43*** -209.87*** -496.24*** -343.86*** -317.80*** -253.23*** -315.84*** -226.54*** 
(147.71) (120.61) (52.19) (120.58) (115.97) (103.75) (83.20) (114.77) (52.05) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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IV. Sensitivity 
Our main results show that IT adoption has a favorable effect on both sovereign debt ratings 
and government bond yield spreads in the emerging countries in our sample. In the following, 
we investigate the sensitivity of these findings. 
 
4.1. The quality of the matching 
We analyze the robustness of matching result with respect to the two PSM assumptions, 
namely the common support and the conditional independence. 
Regarding the former, the literature suggests different methods for assessing the performance 
of estimated PS as balanced scores. One commonly-used approach is a t-test of the null 
hypothesis of the mean between treated and control groups, conditional to estimated PS. 
Intuitively, after controlling for PS, there should not be any significant difference between 
treated and untreated observations in the common support area. However, this approach is not 
immune to criticism. On the one hand, the t-test is computed on observations from the 
common support, so the result would be sensitive to the matching algorithm (Lee, 2013). On 
the other hand, the right approach should be based on total sample characteristics (Imai et al., 
2008). For these reasons, we follow Sianesi (2004) and re-estimate PS on matched units using 
a probit model. For each estimated ATT, we report a pseudo R2, defined as the difference 
between the pseudo R2 for the matched sample and for the unmatched sample. A small 
pseudo R2 signals that PS can be used as balanced scores. Results in Table 5 for ratings and 
in Table 6 spreads reveal pseudo R2 fairly close to 0. Thus, our matching allowed obtaining 
balanced scores, for estimating the treatment effect of IT adoption on both debt ratings and 
bond yield spreads. 
Regarding the latter, the validity of matching estimations is related to the potential influence 
of non-observable variables. To test this assumption of selection on observables, we use the 
statistical test of Mantel & Hsenszel (1959).19 This test evaluates how strongly the 
contribution of non-observable could bias our findings, by testing the null hypothesis that the 
effect of IT adoption on ratings or spreads is zero. We report the statistic for the upper bound 
under the assumption that the treatment effect has been overestimated. The results of the test, 
together with 5 and 10% bounds, show that our findings may be questioned around an odds 
                                                          
19 The Mantel & Hsenszel (1959) statistical test implementation requires a binary outcome variable. Thus, we 
transform our outcome variables to dichotomous variables, taking a value of 1 if there is a rating upgrade or a 
decrease in bond yield spread for a given country between two periods, and 0 otherwise. To insure that this 
transformation does not lead to false conclusions, we re-estimate in each case the ATT of IT with the binary 
outcome variables (we report that results are consistent with our previous findings). 
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ratio between 1.85 and 2.7 for sovereign debt ratings (see Table 5), and between 2.35 and 3.9 
for government yield spreads (see Table 6). In other words, the estimated effect of IT 
adoption on sovereign debt ratings and bond yield spreads is robust provided that unobserved 
variables do not change the odds ratio between treated and control units by more than a factor 
around 2.5. In light of results highlighted by other studies (for instance, Caliendo & Künn, 
2011, concluded with critical values between 1.25 and 3), we can conclude that our findings 
are fairly robust to the conditional independence assumption. 
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Table 5. ATT of IT adoption on Sovereign Debt Ratings (conservative IT starting dates): Sensitivity 
Dependent variable: Sovereign Debt Ratings 
Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
2.459** 2.269** 2.257** 2.367*** 2.216*** 2.339*** 2.410*** 2.327*** 2.679*** 
(0.560) (0.532) (0.453) (0.519) (0.458) (0.363) (0.354) (0.334) (0.558) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/330/477 
Testing matching quality: Common support assumption  
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.004 
Testing matching quality: Independence conditional assumption  
MH bounds 
p-value=0.05 2.45 1.85 2.1 2 2 1.95 2.15 1.95 2.6 
p-value=0.10 2.5 1.9 2.1 2 2 2 2.2 2 2.7 
Heterogeneity in treatment effects  
Comparing IT with Exchange Rate Targeting  
[14] IT vs Exchange rate targeting 
2.537*** 2.601*** 2.582*** 2.750*** 2.328*** 2.420*** 2.489*** 2.395*** 2.424*** 
(0.594) (0.509) (0.487) (0.583) (0.495) (0.385) (0.368) (0.397) (0.713) 
Phase of the business cycle  
[15] Good times 
1.758** 1.855*** 2.172*** 2.685*** 2.449*** 1.617*** 1.828*** 1.656*** 2.007*** 
(0.771) (0.725) (0.604) (0.943) (0.712) (0.540) (0.509) (0.547) (0.007) 
[16] Bad times 
2.767*** 2.738*** 2.740*** 2.858*** 2.659*** 2.532*** 2.813*** 2.554*** 2.231* 
(0.693) (0.660) (0.619) (0.879) (0.739) (0.544) (0.482) (0.538) (1.356) 
Fiscal stance  
[17] Strong fiscal stance 
2.566*** 2.582*** 2.565*** 2.880*** 2.512*** 2.862*** 2.618*** 2.809*** 2.974*** 
(0.625) (0.569) (0.544) (0.962) (0.728) (0.516) (0.534) (0.515) (0.873) 
[18] Loose fiscal stance 
1.935*** 2.159*** 1.986*** 2.932*** 2.509*** 2.037*** 2.177*** 2.029*** 2.732** 
(0.933) (0.797) (0.791) (1.065) (0.863) (0.688) (0.684) (0.708) (1.176) 
Level of economic development  
[19] Lower-middle income countries 
1.214 1.023 1.182** 1.458 1.782 0.662 0.789 0.715 0.317 
(0.727) (0.666) (0.595) (1.429) (1.205) (0.668) (0.620) (0.622) (0.689) 
[20] Upper-middle income countries 
1.181* 1.526*** 1.794*** 1.629*** 1.796*** 1.723*** 1.870*** 1.699*** 1.926*** 
(0.656) (0.602) (0.560) (0.697) (0.551) (0.485) (0.464) (0.479) (0.049) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. ATT of IT adoption on Government Bond Yield Spreads (conservative IT starting dates): Sensitivity 
Dependent variable: GBY Spreads 
N Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
-380.29** -315.53** -274.75** -454.45*** -345.10*** -235.09* -271.24*** -244.61** -226.54*** 
(172.78) (161.84) (140.14) (138.18) (126.72) (125.54) (106.99) (111.98) (52.05) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/316/456 140/255/395 
Testing matching quality: Common support assumption 
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.103 0.065 0.033 0.034 0.048 0.136 0.050 0.047 
Testing matching quality: Independence conditional assumption  
MH bounds 
p-value=0.05 2.7 2.85 2.35 3.85 3.35 3.25 3.7 3.25 3.55 
p-value=0.10 2.8 2.9 2.4 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.6 
Heterogeneity in treatment effects  
Comparing IT with Exchange Rate Targeting  
[14] IT vs Exchange rate targeting 
-308.96* -252.60* -290.63*** -194.39 -205.97* -282.36** -273.06*** -283.77*** -192.31*** 
(164.92) (151.86) (124.38) (137.50) (127.24) (122.32) (101.34) (107.28) (61.20) 
Phase of the business cycle 
[15] Good times 
-46.01 -55.94 -75.68** -97.23 -108.90** -73.38** -64.41* -51.13 -165.27*** 
(49.67) (44.59) (38.97) (69.85) (52.48) (37.09) (35.05) (33.37) (56.73) 
[16] Bad times 
-50.23 -56.05 -47.48 -32.61 -37.05 -118.87 -117.13 -112.98 -629.13 
(205.41) (172.22) (149.07) (256.33) (187.13) (137.75) (113.41) (128.78) (407.32) 
Fiscal policy stance 
[17] Strong fiscal stance 
-78.83* -72.97* -71.24 -109.13* -95.11** -66.58* -88.40*** -66.63* -103.31** 
(46.53) (41.30) (40.88) (68.81) (49.97) (35.74) (34.60) (37.47) (42.24) 
[18] Loose fiscal stance 
-185.95 -362.17 -274.68 -145.51 -214.97 -281.40 -280.45 -280.57 -549.80 
(264.52) (243.88) (207.61) (299.39) (229.68) (214.21) (222.62) (221.25) (493.35) 
Level of economic development 
[19] Lower-middle income countries 
-85.48 -138.40 -109.85 -265.19 -255.51 -78.56 -143.04 -88.69 -594.40 
(188.94) (161.45) (148.63) (335.47) (303.95) (186.35) (182.64) (191.41) (557.12) 
[20] Upper-middle income countries 
-239.43 -236.56 -315.98* -259.04* -252.97* -357.23** -346.57*** -357.23** -188.84*** 
(198.81) (169.27) (189.28) (173.11) (158.66) (161.50) (137.64) (166.71) (43.92) 
Government Bond Yield Spreads Variability 
[21] GBY Spreads variability -56.85 -65.71* -75.97** -59.86* -73.99** -82.10*** -80.95*** -83.62*** -55.50*** 
 (44.92) (36.04) (33.88) (37.32) (31.79) (28.77) (28.70) (31.52) (15.58) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.2. Heterogeneity of the treatment effect of IT adoption 
4.2.1. Sovereign debt ratings 
We begin by analyzing the effect of IT adoption on sovereign debt ratings. First, as 
emphasized by Lin & Ye (2012), exchange rate targeting is a credible and effective monetary 
strategy in emerging countries. Thus, to compare IT with exchange rate targeting, we exclude 
fixed exchange rate countries from the control group. The estimated ATT reported in line [14] 
in Table 5 is positive and still statistically significant. Thus, IT adoption has a favorable effect 
on sovereign debt ratings in emerging countries, compared to emerging countries under 
exchange rate targeting. 
Second, we look for potential differences in the effect of IT adoption depending on the phase 
of the business cycle. For example, during recessions, the economy may be in a “liquidity 
trap”; in this case, the question is not fighting inflation, but rather avoiding a risk of deflation. 
Indeed, Fraga et al. (2003) state that, given its credibility and transparency, one of the most 
appealing IT features is its relative flexibility in the presence of shocks. Thus, IT might be 
effective both in expansion and recession periods. We examine this hypothesis by 
distinguishing between “good” and “bad” times, such as the former (latter) periods are 
defined by a positive (negative) output gap.20 Estimations presented in lines [15]-[16] in 
Table 5 confirm our hypothesis. On the one hand, IT adoption significantly improves 
sovereign debt ratings both in good and in bad times. However, on the other hand, the 
estimated ATT are stronger (and even by as much as 1 pp in five out of nine cases) in bad 
compared to good times: the effect of IT adoption in reducing sovereign debt ratings is more 
important in bad times, revealing its particular performance against large shocks. 
Third, we examine a potential influence of the fiscal stance on the effect of IT adoption on 
ratings. Indeed, in the presence of a large public debt, the impossibility to resort to 
seigniorage because of IT can turn a loose fiscal policy into extremely damageable for public 
debt dynamics (Sargent & Wallace, 1981). This may lead to fiscal dominance, thus making IT 
less credible. We test this hypothesis by distinguishing between “strong” and “loose” fiscal 
stance, using the median level of total government debt to separate the two groups. As 
emphasized by lines [17]-[18] in Table 5, IT adoption has a significant and favorable effect on 
ratings, irrespective of the fiscal stance. However, IT adoption effectiveness is more 
pronounced for countries with a strong fiscal stance (in eight out of nine cases), consistent 
                                                          
20 Output gap is computed as the difference between actual and potential GDP, and potential GDP is computed 
based on the popular Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested by Ravn & Uhlig 
(2002). 
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with the conclusions of Lin & Ye (2009). Consequently, by strengthening IT credibility, 
better policy coordination between fiscal and monetary policies contributes to a higher effect 
of IT adoption on sovereign debt ratings. 
Fourth, macroeconomic performances of emerging countries display substantial 
heterogeneity. We analyze this potential heterogeneity by distinguishing between “lower-
middle income” and “upper-middle income” countries, based on World Bank’s classification 
(see Appendices 3 and 4). Estimated ATT reported in lines [19]-[20] in Table 5 show that, 
unlike its favorable effect in upper-middle income countries, IT adoption does not have a 
statistically significant effect on ratings in lower-middle income countries. Thus, IT adoption 
perception differs with the level of economic development, suggesting that financial rating 
agencies attribute enough credibility to IT adoption in order to modify rates only in relatively 
more developed countries. 
Finally, we equally performed the sensitivity analysis on default, instead of conservative, IT 
starting dates (see Appendix 9). If most of results are consistent with our previous findings, 
accounting for IT default dates is no longer associated with strong differences between good 
and bad times. Only in one out of nine cases the difference equals one rating grade, meaning 
that a full-fledged IT must be in place for credit rating agencies to value more IT adoption in 
bad times. 
 
4.2.2. Government bond yield spreads 
Let us now turn to the effect of IT adoption on bond yield spreads. First, we compare IT 
countries to exchange rate targeting countries, by abstracting of fixed exchange rate countries 
from the control group. As illustrated by line [14] in Table 6, IT adoption significantly 
decreases bond yield spreads, compared to emerging countries with exchange rate targeting. 
Second, lines [15]-[16] in Table 6 display estimated ATT for “good” and “bad” times. If some 
effects are at work in good times, IT adoption had no significant effect on bond yield spreads 
in bad times in the emerging countries in our sample. Thus, contrary to rating agencies (see 
line [16] in Table 5), markets do not see IT adoption as a sufficiently binding constraint on 
debt dynamics in “bad” times, and thus do not mirror this monetary institutional change into 
significant spreads reductions. 
Third, the effect of IT adoption on spreads radically changes with the fiscal stance. On the one 
hand, adopting IT in a context of strong fiscal stance significantly decreases spreads (see line 
[17] in Table 6), consistent with its favorable effect on ratings. However, on the other hand, 
under a loose fiscal stance, IT adoption has no significant impact on spreads (see line [18] in 
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Table 6), contrary to its favorable effect on ratings. Yet again, markets seem to be more 
sensitive than rating agencies to the joint behavior of fiscal and monetary policies, as poor 
fiscal policies inhibit IT credibility from the standpoint of risk-aversion investors. 
Fourth, disaggregating the effect of IT adoption on government bond spreads upon the level 
of economic development leads to findings comparable to its effect on ratings. Contrary to its 
lack of impact in lower-middle income countries (line [19] in Table 6), IT adoption is found 
to significantly decrease spreads in upper-middle income countries (line [20] in Table 6). 
Thus, similar to notation agencies, markets also value IT adoption in relatively more 
developed emerging countries. 
Fifth, we estimate the effect of IT on bond yield spreads variability, defined as the standard 
deviation of the thirty-six-months moving average of monthly yield spreads level. Results 
depicted on line [21] in Table 6 show that IT adoption significantly decreases government 
borrowing cost variability (the estimated ATT is significant in 8 out of 9 cases), and that this 
decrease is economically meaningful, namely between -55.50 (for stratification matching) and 
-83.62 (for kernel matching) basis points. Given an average yield variability of 232 basis 
points in no-IT countries, our findings are that IT adoption can reduce government borrowing 
cost variability by nearly 30 percent in emerging countries. 
Finally, evidence based on default IT starting dates is mostly consistent with results based on 
conservative dates (see Appendix 10). However, there is an important exception: IT adoption 
no longer significantly decreases bond yield spreads compared to emerging countries under 
exchange rate targeting. Corroborated with a previous result that highlighted the benefits of 
full-fledged IT in bad times, this finding shows that there exist cases in which full-fledged IT 
perform better than partial IT in terms of sovereign debt risk. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We explored in this paper the potential impact of inflation targeting adoption on sovereign 
debt risk. Our paper contributes to the scarce literature on this topic on several grounds, 
including (i) alternative measures of sovereign debt risk, (ii) the use of propensity scores 
matching to control for a self-selection bias in IT adoption, (iii) the use of a large sample of 
38 emerging countries, and (iv) a wide analysis of the sensitivity of the effect of IT adoption 
on sovereign risk, with respect to the phase of the business cycle, the fiscal stance, and the 
level of economic development. 
Our results are as twofold. On the one hand, we find that IT adoption significantly increases 
sovereign debt ratings and reduces government bond yield spreads. The magnitude of these 
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effects is economically meaningful: an increase between one and two rating levels, and a 
decrease between 2 and 4 pp for spreads. These findings are robust to a wide set of alternative 
specifications for computing propensity scores, including the use of different sub samples or 
controlling for the determinants of sovereign bond risk previously highlighted in the 
literature, and they do not depend on the employed matching method. On the other hand, we 
show that the effect of IT adoption on sovereign debt risk heavily depends on economic 
conditions. Regarding ratings, IT adoption increases them more during “bad” times and in 
countries with strong fiscal stance, and significantly increases ratings only in upper-middle 
income countries. Regarding spreads, IT adoption has no significant effect in “bad” times in 
countries with loose fiscal stance, and in lower-middle income countries. Our estimations 
confirm that rating agencies and markets sometimes value differently the adoption of the IT 
monetary framework, and justify our choice of capturing the diversity of sovereign debt risk 
through alternative measures. 
Consequently, this paper develops the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond risk, 
by showing that adopting an IT monetary regime can provide benefits in terms of both higher 
ratings and lower spreads in emerging countries. In addition, our analysis provides insightful 
evidence on the practical implementation of IT: the highest benefits of IT adoption in terms of 
reducing sovereign debt risk arise when combined with a good fiscal stance and in relatively 
more developed emerging countries, provided that a full-fledged IT monetary framework is 
achieved. Under such conditions, IT adoption can improve emerging market economies’ 
access to international financial markets, and provide an appropriate monetary strategy to 
finance long-term investment projects and support potential economic growth. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: TO BE PUBLISHED EXCLUSIVELY ON-LINE 
 
Appendix 1. Sovereign Debt Ratings and Bond Yield Spreads before and after IT adoption 
 
 
Appendix 2. IT countries (treated group) and their IT starting dates. 
Pays Default starting dates Conservative starting dates 
Brazil2 Jun 1999 Jun 1999 
Chile2 January 1991 August 1999 
Colombia2 September 1999 October 1999 
Ghana1 January 2007 January 2007 
Hungary2 Jun 2001 August 2001 
Mexico2 January 1999 January 2001 
Peru2 January 2002 January 2002 
Philippines1 January 2002 January 2002 
Poland2 September 1998 September 1998 
South Africa2 February 2000 February 2000 
South Korea2 April 1998 April 1998 
Turkey2 January 2006 January 2006 
1 Lower-middle-income economies. 2 Upper-middle-income economies. 
 
Appendix 3. Non-IT countries (control group) 
Argentina2 Georgia1 Panama2 
Belize2 Indonesia1 Russian Federation2 
Bulgaria2 Jamaica2 Sri Lanka1 
China2 Kazakhstan2 Tunisia2 
Dominican Republic2 Lebanon2 Ukraine1 
Ecuador2 Malaysia2 Uruguay2 
Egypt. Arab Republic1 Morocco1 Venezuela2 
El Salvador1 Nigeria1 Vietnam1 
Gabon1 Pakistan1   
1 Lower-middle-income economies. 2 Upper-middle-income economies. 
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Appendix 4. Linear transformation of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch ratings for long-term debt 
 
Rating Grade Risk level Moody's S&P Fitch Numerical value 
Investment grade  
Highest quality Aaa AAA AAA 20 
High quality 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 19 
Aa2 AA AA 18 
Aa3 AA- AA- 17 
Strong payment capacity 
A1 A+ A+ 16 
A2 A A 15 
A3 A- A- 14 
Adequate payment capacity 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 13 
Baa2 BBB BBB 12 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 11 
Speculative grade 
Likely to fulfill obligations, ongoing 
uncertainly 
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 10 
Ba2 BB BB 9 
Ba3 BB- BB- 8 
High credit risk 
B1 B+ B+ 7 
B2 B B 6 
B3 B- B- 5 
Very high credit risk with possibility 
of recovery 
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 4 
Caa2 CCC CCC 3 
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 2 
Ca CC CC 1 
  C 0 
C SD RD 0 
Default C D D 0 
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Appendix 5. Probit estimates of Propensity Scores for Sovereign Debt Ratings: Default starting IT dates 
  [0] [1] No [2] No [3] No [4] Adding [5]Adding [6] Adding [7] Adding [8] Adding [9] Adding [10]Adding [11]Adding [12]Adding 
VARIABLES 
Baseline 
model dollarized hyperinflation 
Top oil 
exporters 
total 
reserves 
external 
debt unemployment 
crisis 
contagion fiscal rule 
gdp per 
capita M2/gdp 
REER 
volatility 
IMF 
programme 
              
Lagged inflation -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.0896*** -0.0940*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.110*** -0.102*** -0.100*** -0.0984*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0156) 
Real gdp growth -0.0345* -0.0355* -0.0422** -0.0220 -0.0482** -0.0319 -0.0341* -0.0312 -0.0351* -0.0729* -0.0343* -0.0511*** -0.0253 
 (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0218) (0.0215) (0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0377) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0216) 
Lagged log total debt/gdp -0.435*** -0.449*** -0.447*** -0.759*** -0.279**  -0.436*** -0.435*** -0.421*** -0.443*** -0.437*** -0.442*** -0.506*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.141) (0.130)  (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.137) 
Lagged fiscal deficit -0.0549*** -0.0517*** -0.0551*** -0.0683*** -0.0651*** -0.0143 -0.0549*** -0.0597*** -0.0541*** -0.0558*** -0.0509** -0.0604*** -0.0882*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.0239) (0.0236) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0194) (0.0235) 
law and order -0.164** -0.200*** -0.171** -0.0830 -0.240*** -0.132** -0.164** -0.151** -0.139* -0.169** -0.209*** -0.157** -0.182** 
 (0.0670) (0.0692) (0.0674) (0.0745) (0.0732) (0.0625) (0.0673) (0.0681) (0.0710) (0.0673) (0.0741) (0.0696) (0.0717) 
Log trade openness/gdp -0.592 -0.478 -0.495 -0.0960 0.302 -0.626 -0.586 -0.452 -0.585 -0.581 -0.732 -0.472 -1.452** 
 (0.580) (0.580) (0.580) (0.649) (0.649) (0.577) (0.577) (0.574) (0.573) (0.578) (0.598) (0.590) (0.634) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy -1.838*** -1.615*** -1.853*** -1.630*** -1.830*** -1.811*** -1.839*** -1.862*** -1.819*** -1.851*** -1.864*** -1.742*** -1.716*** 
 (0.230) (0.238) (0.232) (0.233) (0.275) (0.221) (0.231) (0.237) (0.230) (0.226) (0.242) (0.233) (0.242) 
Log total exchange reserves     8.573***         
     (1.076)         
Lagged log external debt/gni      -0.268        
      (0.307)        
Unemployment rate       0.0119       
       (0.119)       
Sovereign debt crisis 
contagion        0.143      
        (0.0972)      
Fiscal rule         0.219     
         (0.139)     
Log gdp per capita          3.878    
          (3.144)    
Log M2/gdp           0.272**   
           (0.138)   
REER volatility            -0.0188*  
            (0.0113)  
IMF programme dummy             -0.357** 
             (0.151) 
Constant 3.499*** 3.528*** 3.467*** 3.437*** -25.28*** 2.246*** 3.469*** 3.181*** 3.223*** 3.580*** 2.755*** 3.399*** 4.962*** 
 (0.904) (0.897) (0.906) (1.052) (3.708) (0.847) (0.932) (0.905) (0.913) (0.896) (0.928) (0.931) (1.031) 
Pseudo R2 0.2742 0.2496 0.2698 0.2604 0.3586 0.2647 0.2742 0.2765 0.2780 0.2758 0.2790 0.2533 0.2771 
Observations 601 544 587 505 601 609 601 601 601 601 601 571 535 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 6: ATT of Inflation Targeting on Sovereign Debt Ratings: Default starting IT dates. 
Dependent variable: SD Ratings 
N Nearest Neighbour Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
2.768*** 2.213*** 2.332** 2.348*** 2.216*** 2.435*** 2.485*** 2.429*** 2.653** 
(0.556) (0.502) (0.457) (0.475) (0.458)  (0.365) (0.330) (0.357) (0.760) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 134/394/528 142/394/536 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 
Robustness checks  
[1] Excluding dollarized countries 
2.328*** 2.459*** 2.394*** 2.473*** 2.403*** 2.463*** 2.513*** 2.468*** 2.962** 
(0.555) (0.505) (0.454) (0.534) (0.441) (0.355) (0.336) (0.355) (0.749) 
[2] Excluding hyperinflation episodes 
2.768*** 2.229*** 2.332*** 2.359*** 2.350*** 2.428*** 2.478*** 2.422*** 2.137* 
(0.530) (0.505) (0.458) (0.479) (0.464) (0.356) (0.349) (0.355) (1.105) 
[3] Excluding top oil net exporting countries 
2.345*** 2.073*** 2.128*** 2.171*** 2.034*** 2.084*** 2.165*** 2.070*** 4.212** 
(0.610) (0.522) (0.507) (0.572) (0.501) (0.383) (0.364) (0.398) (2.158) 
[4] Adding total reserves 
2.235*** 1.912*** 1.850*** 2.041*** 2.112*** 1.965*** 1.957*** 1.932*** 3.632 
(0.623) (0.570) (0.516) (0.572) (0.499) (0.430) (0.404) (0.451) (2.394) 
[5] Adding external debt 
3.150*** 2.652*** 2.687** 3.133*** 2.710*** 2.728*** 2.825*** 2.710*** 2.923 
(0.571) (0.495) (0.468) (0.443) (0.414) (0.353) (0.337) (0.331) (1.898) 
[6] Adding unemployment 
2.113*** 2.411*** 2.387*** 2.055*** 2.404*** 2.440*** 2.545*** 2.482*** 2.643** 
(0.570) (0.491) (0.452) (0.493) (0.430) (0.376) (0.357) (0.355) (1.113) 
[7] Adding crisis contagion 
2.156*** 2.201*** 2.078*** 2.539*** 2.131*** 2.236*** 2.361*** 2.227*** 3.776* 
(0.569) (0.512) (0.461) (0.488) (0.426) (0.369) (0.336) (0.388) (2.081) 
[8] Adding fiscal rule 
2.615*** 2.444*** 2.369*** 2.434*** 2.491*** 2.374*** 2.523*** 2.430*** 2.317*** 
(0.580) (0.473) (0.450) (0.470) (0.409) (0.342) (0.347) (0.348) (0.605) 
[9] Adding gdp per capita 
2.350*** 2.558*** 2.561*** 2.474*** 2.506*** 2.469*** 2.499*** 2.441*** 2.746*** 
(0.544) (0.503) (0.474) (0.501) (0.460) (0.377) (0.335) (0.372) (0.462) 
[10] Adding M2/gdp 
1.816*** 2.001*** 2.205*** 2.042*** 2.133*** 2.164*** 2.333*** 2.199*** 2.562*** 
(0.582) (0.537) (0.480) (0.512) (0.462) (0.343) (0.374) (0.376) (0.782) 
[11] Adding REER volatility 
3.008*** 2.765*** 2.516*** 2.650*** 2.617*** 2.626*** 2.618*** 2.613*** 3.723** 
(0.550) (0.535) (0.472) (0.479) (0.448) (0.340) (0.334) (0.365) (1.698) 
[12] Adding IMF programme 
2.699*** 2.566*** 2.655*** 2.719*** 2.522*** 2.409*** 2.460*** 2.406*** 2.653*** 
(0.543) (0.505) (0.452) (0.482) (0.429) (0.359) (0.383) (0.384) (0.761) 
[13] Numerical rating from 1 to 17 
2.768*** 2.191*** 2.303*** 2.331*** 2.330*** 2.409*** 2.459*** 2.403*** 2.635*** 
(0.537) (0.499) (0.474) (0.499) (0.437) (0.343) (0.329) (0.361) (0.743) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 7: Probit estimates of Propensity Scores for Government Bond Yield Spreads: Default starting IT dates. 
  [0] Baseline [1] No [2] No [3] No [4] Adding [5] Adding [6] Adding [7] Adding [8] Adding [9] Adding [10] Adding [11]Adding [12]Adding 
VARIABLES model dollarized hyperinfl Top oil exp ext debt unempl crisis cont CA balance fiscal rule gdp pc M2/gdp REER vol IMF prog 
Lagged inflation -0.0941*** -0.094*** -0.0939*** -0.0646*** -0.094*** -0.0913*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.090*** -0.094*** -0.107*** -0.0841*** -0.0837*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0159) 
Real gdp growth -0.0596*** -0.060*** -0.0630*** -0.0481** -0.0515** -0.0484** -0.0407* -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.0622 -0.0634*** -0.0725*** -0.0325 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0235) (0.0204) (0.0198) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0414) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0216) 
Lagged log total debt/gdp -0.241* -0.249* -0.250* -0.757***  -0.259* -0.282** -0.309** -0.233* -0.242* -0.206 -0.248* -0.382** 
 (0.134) (0.133) (0.134) (0.171)  (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.142) (0.134) (0.166) 
Lagged fiscal deficit -0.0604** -0.0582** -0.0608** -0.0914*** -0.0283 -0.0615** -0.081*** -0.0400* -0.0596** -0.0605** -0.0677*** -0.0677*** -0.0890*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0303) (0.0188) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0284) 
law and order -0.258*** -0.268*** -0.261*** -0.250*** -0.294*** -0.244*** -0.218*** -0.298*** -0.242*** -0.258*** -0.197** -0.238*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0732) (0.0742) (0.0735) (0.0815) (0.0724) (0.0715) (0.0734) (0.0696) (0.0769) (0.0732) (0.0777) (0.0756) (0.0749) 
Log total exchange reserves 8.688*** 8.341*** 8.716*** 13.02*** 10.10*** 9.602*** 9.514*** 10.30*** 8.569*** 8.680*** 10.31*** 8.711*** 9.575*** 
 (1.093) (1.159) (1.099) (1.459) (1.224) (1.179) (1.143) (1.210) (1.089) (1.093) (1.338) (1.134) (1.358) 
Log trade openness/gdp 0.233 0.232 0.306 -0.257 0.0107 0.470 0.797  0.199 0.234 0.678 0.384 -0.612 
 (0.660) (0.652) (0.663) (0.719) (0.660) (0.642) (0.662)  (0.657) (0.660) (0.685) (0.660) (0.671) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy -1.826*** -1.752*** -1.829*** -1.390*** -1.774*** -1.801*** -1.892*** -1.975*** -1.801*** -1.827*** -1.728*** -1.778*** -1.464*** 
 (0.271) (0.289) (0.269) (0.270) (0.251) (0.268) (0.293) (0.289) (0.271) (0.267) (0.267) (0.278) (0.253) 
sovereign debt crisis -1.548** -1.563** -1.282* - -1.747*** -1.520**  -1.366* -1.596** -1.546** -1.622** -1.219* -1.405** 
 (0.766) (0.772) (0.726) (-) (0.658) (0.767)  (0.697) (0.768) (0.767) (0.806) (0.658) (0.641) 
Lagged log external debt/gni     0.867**         
     (0.346)         
Unemployment rate      0.0483***        
      (0.0140)        
Sovereign debt crisis contagion       0.389***       
       (0.124)       
Current account balance        -0.062***      
        (0.0150)      
Fiscal rule         0.136     
         (0.149)     
Log gdp per capita          0.256    
          (3.433)    
Log M2/gdp           -0.468**   
           (0.188)   
REER volatility            -0.0191  
            (0.0121)  
IMF programme dummy             0.0461 
             (0.158) 
Constant -25.53*** -24.35*** -25.67*** -36.95*** -31.52*** -29.23*** -29.24*** -29.96*** -25.27*** -25.49*** -29.70*** -25.82*** -27.04*** 
 (3.759) (3.954) (3.781) (4.669) (4.211) (4.065) (3.999) (3.825) (3.746) (3.759) (4.352) (3.873) (4.577) 
Pseudo R2/Observations 0.3707/601 0.3398/544 0.3649/587 0.3967/480 0.3811/609 0.3833/601 0.3728/601 0.3942/606 0.3720/601 0.3708/601 0.3795/601 0.3507/571 0.3721/535 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 8: ATT of Inflation Targeting on Government Bond Yield Spreads: Default starting IT dates 
Dependent variable: GBY Spreads 
N Nearest Neighbour Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
-244.38 -218.21* -240.39* -182.08 -201.61* -276.36** -284.36*** -280.64*** -179.85*** 
(159.76) (133.01) (128.42) (114.25) (107.70) (112.32) (107.72) (106.26) (61.21) 
Treated/Untreated/Total observations 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 140/255/395 
Robustness checks  
[1] Excluding dollarized countries 
-300.73** -283.59** -343.97*** -289.30** -214.54* -257.97*** -248.44*** -255.86*** -220.09* 
(141.10) (127.98) (102.09) (126.88) (116.16) (90.95) (101.13) (87.83) (118.95) 
[2] Excluding hyperinflation episodes 
-317.19** -339.50*** -304.35*** -268.79*** -259.35** -246.75*** -241.55*** -239.94*** -234.78* 
(142.21) (109.85) (101.39) (107.73) (112.357) (86.13) (78.33) (89.70) (118.60) 
[3] Excluding top oil net exporting countries 
-181.01*** -129.79** -122.05** -119.59** -141.94*** -138.82*** -139.43*** -137.61*** -197.71* 
(63.82) (56.56) (52.24) (60.38) (51.28) (45.73) (39.43) (43.31) (101.91) 
[4] Adding external debt 
-255.30** -199.94** -214.43** -241.17** -230.89** -199.03** -205.59** -201.97*** -272.08*** 
(114.36) (98.20) (98.00) (104.64) (101.66) (85.54) (84.92)  (78.06) (70.54) 
[5] Adding unemployment 
-95.75 -143.90 -203.00* -229.57** -204.46* -216.71* -200.51* -214.48** -202.76** 
(149.70) (126.97) (119.20) (116.75) (122.21) (124.74) (123.00) (107.64) (87.74) 
[6] Adding crisis contagion 
-230.67* -149.93 -143.92 -93.64 -100.97 -213.87** -313.68** -210.87** -175.16 
(130.07) (105.22) (90.29) (87.99) (77.56) (97.03) (129.14) (97.34) (152.52) 
[7] Adding current account balance 
-317.19** -339.50*** -304.35*** -269.30*** -259.75*** -247.93*** -242.70*** -241.04** -222.10 
(165.99) (127.94) (114.52) (96.76) (101.11) (94.74) (89.91)  (104.56) (196.99) 
[8] Adding fiscal rule 
-408.17*** -316.53** -287.54*** -314.20*** -417.50*** -332.26*** -287.18*** -327.38*** -315.06** 
(144.62) (145.87) (120.99) (122.95) (130.67) (104.23) (107.89) (101.69) (149.72) 
[9] Adding gdp per capita 
-186.02 -262.06** -320.79*** -168.39 -221.26** -275.62*** -277.55*** -276.81** -127.37 
(187.08) (123.20) (130.90)  (113.25) (108.86) (111.68) (110.29) (118.77) (169.29) 
[10] Adding M2/gdp 
-120.83 -237.33** -201.86* -226.22** -229.47** -253.15*** -236.29** -237.36** -262.53* 
(144.52) (116.78) (109.73) (109.03) (103.16) (97.67) (101.38) (98.33) (138.11) 
[11] Adding REER volatility 
-176.89** -165.17* -148.29** -206.52** -156.09** -162.78*** -154.53*** -159.96*** -326.62*** 
(85.26) (89.80) (72.53) (94.59) (81.34) (59.15) (52.25) (55.71) (125.90) 
[12] Adding IMF programme 
-182.66 
(139.86) 
-291.29** 
(126.46) 
-326.01*** 
(116.28) 
-263.48** 
(117.91) 
-209.35* 
(126.99) 
-264.71** 
(111.03) 
-251.09*** 
(84.52) 
-274.95*** 
(96.19) 
-179.85*** 
(61.21) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 9. ATT of IT adoption on Sovereign Debt Ratings (Default IT starting dates): Sensitivity 
Dependent variable: SD Ratings 
Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
2.768*** 2.213*** 2.332** 2.348*** 2.216*** 2.435*** 2.485*** 2.429*** 2.653** 
(0.556) (0.502) (0.457) (0.475) (0.458) (0.365) (0.330) (0.357) (0.760) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 134/394/528 142/394/536 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 147/394/541 
Testing matching quality: Common support assumption  
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.025 0.025 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.005 
Testing matching quality: Independence conditional assumption  
MH bounds 
p-value=0.05 1.55 2.05 1.8  1.95 2.05 2.05 1.85 2.05 2.95 
p-value=0.10 1.6  2.1 1.8  2 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.1 3 
Heterogeneity in treatment effects  
Comparing IT with Exchange Rate Targeting 
[14] IT vs Exchange rate targeting 
2.949*** 2.816*** 2.810*** 2.821*** 2.777*** 2.508*** 2.626*** 2.563*** 2.193*** 
(0.559) (0.547) (0.494) (0.519) (0.450) (0.368) (0.383) (0.390) (0.111) 
Phase of the business cycle 
[15] Good times 
2.065*** 2.383*** 2.168*** 2.066** 1.825*** 2.255*** 2.118*** 2.253*** 3.412*** 
(0.747) (0.643) (0.632) (0.830) (0.613) (0.480) (0.479) (0.542) (1.284) 
[16] Bad times 
2.485*** 2.181*** 2.311*** 3.019*** 2.443*** 2.383*** 2.696*** 2.393*** 3.876*** 
(0.778) (0.718) (0.653) (0.919) (0.758) (0.585) (0.602) (0.612) (4.716) 
Fiscal stance 
[17] Strong fiscal stance 
3.130*** 2.866*** 2.856*** 3.556*** 2.954*** 2.665*** 2.614*** 2.684*** 2.669** 
(0.598) (0.523) (0.488) (0.866) (0.661) (0.465) (0.441) (0.470) (1.204) 
[18] Loose fiscal stance 
2.678*** 2.028*** 2.152*** 2.432*** 2.048*** 2.244*** 2.468*** 2.319*** 3.482 
(0.997) (0.936) (0.797) (1.437) (1.034) (0.851) (0.871) (0.851) (2.326) 
Level of economic development  
[19] Lower-middle income countries 
1.214* 1.023 1.182** 1.458 1.782 0.662 0.789 0.715 0.281 
(0.722) (0.625) (0.601) (1.456) (1.246) (0.691) (0.642) (0.690) (0.726) 
[20] Upper-middle income countries 
1.401** 1.583*** 1.928*** 2.322*** 1.928*** 2.018*** 2.178*** 1.996*** 1.653*** 
(0.624) (0.605) (0.548) (0.637) (0.580) (0.469) (0.443) (0.451) (0.307) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 10. ATT of IT adoption on Government Bond Yield Spreads (Default IT starting dates): Sensitivity 
Dependent variable: GBY Spreads 
N Nearest Neighbor Matching Radius Matching Local linear 
Matching 
Kernel 
Matching 
Stratification 
Matching N=1 N=2 N=3 r=0.005 r=0.01 r=0.05 
Baseline result  
[0] ATT 
-244.38 -218.21* -240.39* -182.08 -201.61* -276.36** -284.36*** -280.64*** -179.85*** 
(159.76) (133.01) (128.42) (114.25) (107.70) (112.32) (107.72) (106.26) (61.21) 
Treated/Untreated/Total Observations 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 142/314/456 140/255/395 
Testing matching quality: Common support assumption  
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.072 0.050 0.021 0.047 0.047 0.101 0.050 0.042 
Testing matching quality: Independence conditional assumption  
MH bounds 
p-value=0.05 1.55 2.05 1.8 1.95 2.05 2.05 1.85 2.05 2.8 
p-value=0.10 1.6 2.1 1.8 2 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.1  2.9 
Heterogeneity in treatment effects 
Comparing IT with Exchange Rate Targeting 
[14] IT vs Exchange rate targeting 
-42.07 -80.47 -114.93 -99.76 -131.12 -177.70* -208.01** -171.32 -409.32* 
(167.03) (112.34) (107.58) (133.41) (104.18) (95.74) (85.76) (117.38) (240.16) 
Phase of the business cycle 
[15] Good times 
-161.93** -115.09* -128.32** -188.53** -169.83*** -105.21** -110.51* -103.15* -160.88*** 
(72.69) (65.05) (62.08) (84.00) (68.05) (53.84) (57.98) (56.42) (45.03) 
[16] Bad times 
-203.00* -229.24** -204.81** -118.07 -126.24 -181.51* -176.63* -192.15** -401.38 
(118.86) (105.63) (101.14) (218.39) (142.72) (95.61) (90.63) (79.90) (367.25) 
Fiscal policy stance 
[17] Strong fiscal stance 
-40.87 -62.93* -72.00* -57.17 -25.86 -69.44* -82.93** -70.74* -98.61** 
(46.91) (38.62) (37.45) (68.70) (51.78) (32.96) (34.16) (31.98) (50.21) 
[18] Loose fiscal stance 
-185.95 -362.17 -274.68 -145.51 -214.97 -281.40 -280.45 -280.57 -549.80 
(268.12) (255.73) (173.80) (303.26) (211.65) (195.63) (209.20) (232.08) (493.35) 
Level of economic development 
[19] Lower-middle income countries 
-395.59** -182.88 -170.86 -283.56 -67.39 -399.09** -381.52** -315.71** -644.42 
(181.55) (146.19) (143.45) (380.75) (352.61) (183.63) (166.53) (158.42) (561.06) 
[20] Upper-middle income countries 
-272.51 -238.61* -299.86** -312.82** -227.99 -288.52* -298.76** -289.74** -211.98*** 
(187.09) (146.17) (134.23) (140.38) (149.92) (156.20) (126.76) (129.21) (14.55) 
Government Bond Yield Spreads Variability 
[21] GBY Spreads Variability -80.72* -95.30** -82.75** -82.10** -87.81*** -99.66*** -99.67*** -95.29*** -122.49* 
 (41.51) (37.34) (33.51) (34.42) (32.06) (27.00) (31.22) (25.91) (73.34) 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 11. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Ratings 
Overall 9.525276 3.211126 1 17 N=633 
between  2.751269 3.885417 4.75833 n=38 
Within  1.601458 2.100277 13.20861 T-bar=16.66 
Spread 
Overall 496.9703 590.2867 0.9801 5779.666 N=515 
between  324.9740 115.5654 1545.097 n=38 
Within  473.0044 -728.2618 4731.54 T-bar=13.55 
 Overall 182.1617 283.3154 0 2418.043 N=579 
Spread between  156.2299 36.43208 763.9998 n=38 
Variability Within  229.0891 -484.6768 1836.205 T-bar=15.23 
Fullit 
Overall 0.1894737 0.3921425 0 1 N=760 
between  0.2936623 0 0.75 n=38 
Within  0.2640018 -0.5605263 0.8894737 T=20 
Softit 
Overall 0.2 0.4002634 0 1 N=760 
between  0.3151576 0 1 n=38 
Within  0.2517397 -0.55 0.9 T=20 
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Appendix 12. Sources and Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Full-fledged IT (conservative 
starting dates) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is under IT regime in a 
given year; 0 otherwise. Conservative starting dates are related to 
full-fledged IT adoption 
Batini et al. (2006), Rose (2007), 
Roger (2009), Gemayel et al. 
(2011), Warburton and Davies 
(2012) Partial IT (default starting dates) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is under IT regime in a 
given year; 0 otherwise. Default starting dates are related to partial 
IT adoption 
Sovereign debt ratings Long-term foreign currency government debt ratings Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch websites 
Government bond yield 
spread 
Yield spread between each emerging country and United States 
sovereign bonds with a minimum size of 500 million USD and an 
average maturity of 12 years 
JP Morgan, Bloomberg 
Government bond yield 
spread variability 
Standard deviation of the thirty-six-months moving average of 
monthly yield spreads level 
Authors’ calculation based on 
government bond yield spread 
data 
Inflation rate Annual growth rate of average CPI 
World Economic Outlook (2014) Public debt (% of GDP) Gross general government debt to GDP Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) General government net lending/borrowing to GDP 
CA balance Current account balance to GDP 
Real gdp growth Annual growth rate of GDP 
World Development Indicators 
(2014) 
External debt (% of GNI) General government external debt to GNI 
Trade openness (% of GDP) Volume of imports and exports divided by GDP 
Total exchange reserves Annual total exchange reserves 
Unemployment rate Annual unemployment rate, in percent of total labor force 
Real gdp per capita Gross domestic product per capita, constant prices USD 
M2 (% of GDP) Money and quasi money (M2) to GDP 
Law and order Index measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system "law" and the assessment of popular observance of the law "order" 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) 
Fixed exchange rate dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is classified as having a de facto fixed exchange rate regime (hard or soft peg); 0 otherwise 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
updated from IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (2011, 
2012) 
Fiscal rule 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country had in place, at the national 
level, a numerical limit on fiscal aggregates (expenditure, revenue, 
budget balance, debt); 0 otherwise 
IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset (2013) 
Sovereign debt crisis Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country expereinces a domestic debt default or an external default; 0 otherwise 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
updated from Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) 
Sovereign debt crisis 
contagion 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one country in a same region 
faces a sovereign debt crisis; 0 otherwise. We use the World Bank 
country classification by region 
Authors calculations based on 
sovereign debt crisis data from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
volatility 
Standard deviation of the three-years moving average of real 
effective exchange rate 
Authors calculations based on 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
from CERDI database (2012) 
IMF programme dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if IMF standby arrangement of IMF 
extended facility arrangement is in effect for at least 5 months in a 
particular year; 0 otherwise  
IMF website 
 
 
